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Analysis of the Valuation of Attorney Work Product
According to the Market for Claims: Reformulating
the Lodestar Method
George B. Murr*
"Soon, my good man, we will know better. Think about something like
the following. Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is
it pious because it is loved?"
Socrates, The Euthyphro l
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose I owned a property interest, a mineral interest in fee simple.
Suppose I were to assign to you a working interest in that property as
part of an oil and gas lease, and you agreed to be the oil and gas
operator. The oil wells you had drilled on the property came in, and we
struck it rich. Or suppose I owned a property interest, rights in a
trademark or a patent. Suppose I were to assign to you a share of that
interest with the agreement that you would provide capital to market the
product. The product was a success and became immensely profitable.
The value of the mineral interest would be determined by the
expected production from the interest in the mineral lease. Likewise,
the value of the patent would be determined by the market for the
product or innovation patented. The central component to the price
negotiated for these interests would be the ability of the parties to apply
their labor and obtain a return on the property. Moreover, the
profitability of the mineral or patent interest rests upon its actual
production. Therefore, parties would pay for the mineral or patent
interest according to what they thought it would be worth, in essence
creating a market for the interest. Driven by competition, this market
automatically would factor the risk accompanying the investment into
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the price. But suppose that instead of receiving a return on these
interests based upon their actual production, I told you that your
recoverable royalty would be limited to a "reasonable royalty."
Now suppose I had a legal claim. I was injured, or my business was
injured. Suppose I were to assign to you a share of that claim with the
agreement that you would provide legal services and attempt to recover
damages and attorney's fees. Both the quality of the legal work I could
seek and the merits of the claim would be a function of the fee interest
negotiated. The case was a winner and we were awarded a significant
damage award. The court, however, would limit the attorney's fee
award to a "reasonable fee." Further, the court's determination of the
reasonableness of the fee would be based not upon the actual
production, but upon the "rules of discipline." All of the sudden
everything has changed. Or has it?
In virtually every American jurisdiction, the rule is that attorney's
fees awarded must be "reasonable." 2 Questions remain, however. What
are the guidelines used by the courts to determine reasonable attorney's
fees? How are the guidelines to be applied?3 Most important, are the
guidelines used by the courts in fact reasonable?4 This Article argues
that reasonable attorney's fees are those that an attorney would be able
to recover on the market for attorney's fees.
After over twenty years of attorney's fee litigation and the application
of various and sundry elements of "reasonableness," the courts are only
2. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) ("It remains for the district court to
determine what fee is 'reasonable'); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.5(a) (1998)
("A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
106 (1983) ("[A] fee is clearly excessive when ... the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.").
With very few exceptions, state jurisdictions have adopted this standard as set forth in either of
the Model Codes. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 41:302-03
(American Bar Association 1995) (detailing the differences in the standard for attorney's fees
between and among the states).
3. As one commentator noted:
Simply providing the lower courts with an exhaustive checklist of relevant factors,
however, has done little to eliminate the confusion .... The fundamental problem
with an approach that does no more than assure that the lower courts will consider a
plethora of conflicting and at least partially redundant factors is that it provides no
analytical framework for their application. It offers no guidance on the relative im-
portance of each factor, whether they are to be applied differently in different contexts,
or, indeed, how they are to be applied at all.
Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
281, 286-87 (1977).
4. "Socrates: Because we agree that the pious is loved because it is pious, not that it is pious
because it is loved, don't we?
Euthyphro: Yes."
PLATO, supra note 1, at 54.
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now beginning to grapple with this principle of market value.5 Courts
in virtually every American jurisdiction evaluate the reasonableness of
the attorney's fee claim using the elements for reasonable fees
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Hensley v.
Eckerhart.6 The elements proposed by the Hensley Court to determine
the reasonableness of attorney's fees were "derive[d] directly from the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. 7  In
addition, these same elements govern the reasonableness of attorney's
fees in both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
newer Model Rules of Professional Conduct and have been adopted in
virtually every state.8  This Article suggests that the current lodestar
5. See Berger, supra note 3, at 322-24.
6. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 (1983).
7. Id.
8. Rule 1.5(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:
A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.5(a) (1998). Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility contains the same elements and provisions:
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary pm-
dence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a
reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness
of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal search properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1983). With some exceptions, the
majority of states have adopted the elements articulated in Model Rule 1.5(a) and Model Code
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method may be adjusted to evaluate attorney work product better by
including a contingent fee market valuation in the lodestar procedure.
Such an adjustment would allow the federal courts to accommodate and
enjoy the market valuation for attorney work product without having to
drastically overhaul or scuttle the lodestar procedure. 9
Part II examines the development of the lodestar procedure and
highlights its administrative and evaluative problems.' °  Part III
examines the suitability of using the market for claims to determine
reasonable attorney's fees, comparing the market for claims to model
markets for mineral interests and patents. l Part III further proposes
that the administrative and evaluative problems of the lodestar can be
addressed by simply altering the procedure to include an evaluation
according to the market of claims. Moreover, Part III suggests that
courts can tap the market for legal claims, already in place to some
degree, in order to ascertain the reasonableness of attorney fees more
easily and accurately.' 2  Part IV concludes that courts may better
analyze and evaluate attorney work product according to the existing
market for claims by reformulating the lodestar.13
II. THE LODESTAR METHOD FOR DETERMINING ATrORNEY' S FEES
A. The Lodestar Procedure for Valuation of Attorney's Fees in the
Federal Courts
The lodestar method of calculating attorney's fees is based upon a
simple formula that multiplies time spent by a reasonable hourly rate. 14
DR 2-106. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 41:302-03
(American Bar Association 1995) (listing 39 states and the District of Columbia).
9. See Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX.
L. REv. 865, 867-68 (1992).
10. See infra Part H (discussing the lodestar method for computing attorney's fees).
11. See infra Part III (discussing the suitability of the market for claims as a basis for deter-
mining reasonable attorneys' fees); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 997, 997 (1992) (using "an oil and gas lease and a long-term requirements
contract between a buyer and a seller with interdependent operations to illustrate some basic fea-
tures of many open term contracts").
12. See infra Part II (suggesting a reformulation of the lodestar method).
13. See infra Part IV (concluding that courts may better evaluate attorney work product by
reformulating the lodestar method).
14. "The starting point or lodestar for setting fees is the time/rate calculation. The court will
look to the amount of time spent and multiply that by the fee generally assessed for comparable
work in the area." 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2675.1 (3d ed. 1998). In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Court stated:
The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable
[Vol. 31
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First devised by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1973,15
the lodestar method provides an estimate for fee awards based on a
combination of hourly rates and hours expended, and then modifies this
estimate with fee enhancements.' 6  The lodestar method, thus,
establishes a two step procedure for determining reasonable attorney's
fees. First, the estimate is calculated using the basic hourly rate
formula. Second, the estimate is modified, either upward or downward,
depending on the circumstances of the case. 17 For example, the court
may adjust the hourly rate "in light of prevailing community standards
to the lawyer's 'experience, skill, and reputation."" 18
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court endorsed the two-step
"lodestar" method of the fee calculation.' 9 First, a court must determine
the initial estimate by "multiplying the number of hours reasonably
necessary to conduct the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate for the
work of the attorney." 20 Second, the court must adjust this estimate to
yield an equitable award.2' Since its adoption by the Supreme Court in
1983, the lodestar analysis has been the subject of considerable
scholarly criticism and judicial frustration.22
hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial
estimate of the value of a lawyer's services. The party seeking an award of fees should
submit evidence supporting the hours worked and the fees claimed. Where the docu-
mentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
15. See Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
167-69 (3d Cir. 1973).
16. See Silver, supra note 9, at 866-67.
17. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319,
324 (5th Cir. 1995).
18. Silver, supra note 9, at 867 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.1 (1984)).
19. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34. The Supreme Court relied on the decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1974), and the 12 factors articulated in Johnson and adopted by the House and Senate Reports
that supported passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(West 2000). See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429-30.
20. Note, Risk Multipliers, 101 HARV. L. REV. 290, 291 (1987).
21. One commentator noted:
In Blum v. Stenson, the Court mandated that fee awards be calculated 'according to
prevailing market rates' in the relevant community and sharply reduced the availability
of upward adjustments of the lodestar. The use of so-called 'risk' or 'contingency' en-
hancements-which add premiums to the lodestar on the basis of the attorney's as-
sumption of the risk of nonpayment that exist in any contingent fee arrangement-has
been particularly controversial.
Id. at 291 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 (1984)) (citations omitted).
22. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 721 (1987). One
commentator acknowledges:
The only truly consistent thread that runs throughout federal court decisions on attor-
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The lodestar method is an artificial valuation of the attorney's work
product to calculate attorney's fees. 23 This method focuses almost
exclusively on hourly rates for attorney's fees and the valuation of
attorney work product. The lodestar considers a contingent fee
agreement only secondarily and does not consider the market's effects
upon contingency fees at all. Accordingly, the lodestar method reviews
contingency fees retrospectively for their reasonableness and, thus, does
not account for reasonableness at the inception of the agreement. 24  In
order to complete the retrospective two-step lodestar analysis, a court
must make three determinations: 25 first, the court must determine the
nature and extent of the services supplied by the attorney; second, the
court must value these services according to prevailing customs; and,
third, the court must determine whether other factors warrant any
adjustments to the calculated estimate.26
neys' fees is their almost complete inconsistency. The resulting confused and con-
flicting state of the law has several unfortunate consequences. First, it inevitably re-
sults in unfairness to both attorneys and litigants. At present, the enormous variation in
fee awards cannot be explained in terms of the differing facts and circumstances from
case to case. Rather, it reflects the dissimilar manner in which various courts approach
the job of fee setting. As a result, from court to court and from case to case, attorneys
and litigants who are similarly situated are subjected to widely differing treatment.
Berger, supra note 3, at 292.
23. One commentator remarked:
Of course, to say that a percentage contingent fee must be 'reasonable' provides no
guidance to lawyers and judges who must apply that standard in particular circum-
stances. DR 2-106(B) [of the Model Code of Professional Conduct] lists factors courts
should consider in determining the reasonableness of a fee; one factor is '[w]hether the
fee is fixed or contingent.'
Henry H. Drummonds, The Law and Ethics of Percentage Contingent Fees in Oregon, 72 OR. L.
REv. 859, 868 (1993) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B)
(1983)).
24. See id. at 872-73.
25. The Court noted:
The amount of the fee, of course, must be determined on the facts of each case. On
this issue the House Report simply refers to 12 factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc ..... The Senate Report cites to Johnson as well and also re-
fers to three District Court decisions that 'correctly applied' the 12 factors. One of the
factors in Johnson, 'the amount involved and the results obtained,' indicates that the
level of a plaintiff's success is relevant to the amount of fees to be awarded.
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1983) (citations omitted); see also infra Part lI.A.3
(discussing the lodestar factors presented in Johnson v, Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1974)).
26. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995); Copper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1092 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled by J.T. Gib-
bons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 790 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Terra-Drill Partnership
Sec. Litig., 733 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (S.D. Tex. 1990). "Determinations of hours and rates are
questions of fact." Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 324.
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1. The Nature and Extent of the Services Supplied by the Attorney
The first task in the lodestar analysis is to provide an estimate of the
number of hours reasonably expended. 27 Because the lodestar method
bases its calculation upon an hourly rate formula, even in contingency
fee cases, attorneys must document time spent on a case with
"contemporaneous billing records." 28 The time records submitted are
subject to scrutiny. In addition, the court must exclude hours that were
not "reasonably expended" from the initial fee calculation.29
The standard lodestar formula further requires that the court disregard
the contingency fee agreement negotiated by the attorney and client on
the basis of the attorney's expertise, the work product, and the merits of
the case. The result is an artificially valued hourly fee based on a
market that was neither consulted nor involved in the negotiation of the
contingent fee. Courts applying the lodestar method thus exalt hourly
market fees in their valuation of attorney work product but ignore the
market that shapes contingency fees.
2. Calculating the Reasonable Rate
The second step in the lodestar analysis is to arrive at a reasonable
hourly rate for the attorney requesting fees. 30  What is considered a
reasonable rate may depend not only on the attorney's actual fee, it may
also be determined by what are presumed to be prevailing rates for
other, similarly situated attorneys. 31  Accordingly, parties seeking
attorney's fees submit evidence regarding their own rates, as well as the
general market rates for attorneys of comparable experience and
expertise. 32 This two-tiered approach may require that a court expand
the range of rates it considers, depending upon what is considered to be
within market norms. 33 The court is required to consider both actual
fees and what it presumes to be comparable market rates, although the
27. See Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 324.
28. See id.
29. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35.
30. See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 873.
31. See Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 328.
32. See id.
33. See id.; Islamic Ctr. v. City of Starkville, 876 F.2d 465, 469 (5th Cir. 1989).
When an attorney's customary billing rate is the rate at which the attorney requests the
lodestar to be computed and that rate is within the range of prevailing market rates, the
court should consider this rate when fixing the hourly rate to be allowed. When the re-
quested rate of compensation exceeds the attorney's usual charge but remains within
the customary range in the community, the district court should consider whether the
requested rate is reasonable.
Islamic Ctr., 876 F.2d at 469 (footnote omitted).
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particular circumstances surrounding the case impact the determination
of what rates are reasonable. Further, rates charged must incorporate
the opportunity cost of other cases and matters that a firm might have
turned away in order to take on the litigation.34 Although the court must
consider market rates and comparable fees charged by similarly situated
attorneys, the fee actually charged in the litigation is that entered into
between the attorney and client.
The lodestar method instructs courts to determine the prevailing
attorney hourly rates according to "the customary range in the
community," notwithstanding the fact that the negotiated fee agreement
may not be related to the "community" at all. Although the court is
required to determine the relevant market for attorney's fees, the
question that arises is how to determine the relevant market. 35  Except
for calculating fees for local counsel, the local market where the
courthouse is seated may have nothing to do with the circumstances
under which the claim arose and where counsel was retained. Indeed,
the legal market for some types of litigation expertise may not even
exist in the locale where suit is filed.36 For example, in Blum v.
Stenson,37 the Court considered an award of attorney's fees to nonprofit
counsel.38 The Blum Court noted that no market exists for nonprofit
counsel, and noted how perfunctory a market analysis becomes:
34. See Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1984), quoted in Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 328; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 1.5(a)(2) (1998) ("The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a
fee include the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employ-
ment will preclude other employment by the lawyer"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(2) (1986) (American Bar Association Center for Professional Re-
sponsibility 1986, produced by the ABA Press) ("Factors to be considered as guides in determin-
ing the reasonableness of a fee include .... The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the ac-
ceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.").
35. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 885, 895 n.ll (1984).
We recognize, of course, that determining an appropriate 'market rate' for the services
of a lawyer is inherently difficult. Market prices of commodities and most services are
determined by supply and demand. In this traditional sense, there is no such thing as a
prevailing market rate for the service of lawyers in a particular community. The type
of services rendered by lawyers, as well as their experience, skill and reputation, varies
extensively-even within a law firm. Accordingly, the hourly rates of lawyers in pri-
vate practice also vary widely.
Id.
36. Compare Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (construing local market rates for non-
lawyer personnel), with Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir.
1988) (construing the legal market for appropriate expertise notwithstanding location).
37. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
38. See id. at 888-89.
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To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the
burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence-in
addition to the attorney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are
in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. A
rate determined in this way is normally deemed to be reasonable, and
is referred to-for convenience-as the prevailing market rate. 39
Therefore, the lodestar analysis requires that courts create a market
for legal services "deemed to be reasonable"40 where in reality no such
market exists. "The Court offers no reason why this market disappears
only when the inquiry turns to [contingency] enhancement. 4 1  Under
the lodestar doctrine, the court is required to conjure an hourly market
in a case prosecuted on the basis of a contingent fee agreement. 42
Nevertheless, the "relevant market" utilized by the courts to determine
reasonable rates is not necessarily even related to the fee agreement
reached between the attorney and client.
3. Adjustment Under Other Factors
After the lodestar estimate is calculated by multiplying the hourly
rate by the hours reasonably expended, it must still be "adjusted to
reflect other factors such as the contingent nature of the suit and the
quality of representation. 4 3 Adjustment of the lodestar is based upon
numerous factors. 44 Not all courts, however, apply the adjustment
factors in the same way.4
5
In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,4 6 the Fifth Circuit
listed twelve factors that have been widely adopted, though not
uniformly applied, in adjusting the lodestar calculation:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
39. Id. at 895 n.ll,
40. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 574 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 1087, 1093 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled
by J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 790 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1986).
44. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 329 (5th Cir. 1995); Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). "The district court also
may consider other factors identified in [Johnson], though it should note that many of these fac-
tors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reason-
able hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 n.9 (1983).
45. See 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1803.
46. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
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acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee [for similar work in the
community]; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
(12) awards in similar cases. 47
In applying the Johnson factors, courts must make explicit and concise
factual findings that outline not only those factors it considered in its
cost adjustment, but also those factors that it discounted as of little
significance. 48
One factor under the Johnson test examines whether the fee is fixed
or contingent.49  Therefore, even under the lodestar method of
calculating attorney's fees, a contingency fee arrangement may be
relevant. 50  The Supreme Court, however, has clearly stated that only
the fact of contingency is to be considered and not the contingency fee
agreement itself.51
In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean
Air,52 the Supreme Court addressed the enhancement of the lodestar
calculation based on contingent fees. Justice White, in the plurality
opinion, expressed three guidelines for determining when contingent
fees could be used to enhance the lodestar: (1) determination of whether
the lawyer found an apparent risk of losing at the outset of the lawyer's
involvement in the case; (2) limiting contingent fees to one-third of the
lodestar; and (3) evidence in the record and a specific court finding that
47. Id. at 717-19; see also Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 329; Copper Liquor, Inc.,
684 F.2d at 1092.
48. See Nisby v. Commissioner's Court, 798 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1986); Copper Liquor,
Inc., 684 F.2d at 1093; Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
49. See Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 329; Copper Liquor, Inc., 684 F.2d at 1092-
93; Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), "[i]f di-
rected by the court, the motion [for a claim for attorney's fees] shall disclose the terms of any
agreement with respect to fees to be paid for the services for which claim is made." FED. R. Civ.
P. 54(d)(2)(B).
50. If not produced by the requesting party, the district court may order the production of the
contingency fee arrangement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51.
51. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 723 (1987). The
Court wrote:
At most, therefore, Johnson suggests that the nature of the fee contract between the cli-
ent and his attorney should be taken into account when determining the reasonableness
of a fee award, but there is nothing in Johnson to show that this factor was meant to re-
flect the contingent nature of prevailing in the lawsuit as a whole.
Id.
52. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
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without risk enhancement, the plaintiff would have faced substantial
difficulty in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market.53
B. Deviation From the Lodestar Method of Determining Legal Fees
The Supreme Court and the circuit courts have made clear that the
lodestar method of computing attorney's fees supersedes any contingent
fee agreement. 54  In 1987, the United States Supreme Court held that
contingency fee enhancements are prohibited in determining attorney's
fees in fee-shifting statutes. 55 Instead, contingent fee agreements serve
only as an enhancement under the Johnson factors. That is, the
time/rate calculation is only enhanced by the twelve Johnson factors.
The Supreme Court has reiterated time and again that there is to be no
separate consideration or adjustment for the fact that a case was taken
on a contingency. 56  Nevertheless, one of the twelve Johnson factors
specifically requires consideration of "whether the fee is fixed or
contingent."
57
53. See id. at 728-31.
54. See Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 F.3d at 324-25; Copper Liquor, Inc., 684 F.2d at
1092.
55. See Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 727. This holding was upheld as recently as 1992 in
City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
56. See Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 715 ("The issue before us is whether, when a plaintiff
prevails, its attorney should or may be awarded separate compensation for assuming the risk of
not being paid"); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 902 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he
risk of not prevailing, and therefore the risk of not recovering any attorney's fees is a proper basis
on which a district court may award an upward adjustment to an otherwise compensatory fee.").
57. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983). In Delaware Valley, the Supreme
Court's plurality opinion attempts to distinguish between an overall contingency enhancement to
the lodestar and the use of the contingency contract as one of the 12 factors "determining the rea-
sonableness of a fee award" under the lodestar. Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 723.
But a careful reading of Johnson shows that the contingency factor was meant to focus
judicial scrutiny solely on the existence of any contract for attorney's fees which may
have been executed between the party and his attorney .... At most, therefore, John-
son suggests that the nature of the fee contract between the client and his attorney
should be taken into account when the determining the reasonableness of a fee award,
but there is nothing in Johnson to show that this factor was meant to reflect the contin-
gent nature of prevailing in the lawsuit as a whole.
Id. The distinction is without a difference. It makes no real difference whether the contingency is
considered as one of the 12 Johnson factors to determine reasonableness or whether it is consid-
ered as a separate enhancement factor for the lodestar; regardless of the order in which the con-
tingency factor is considered, so long as it is given equal weight in the analysis, the result is the
same. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) ("We note at the outset that an
enhancement for contingency would likely duplicate in substantial part factors already subsumed
in the lodestar."). The plurality nevertheless provides for an enhancement, subject to a one-third
limitation and the determination that there is a "real risk-of-not-prevailing:"
We deem it desirable and an appropriate application of the statute to hold that if the
trial court specifically finds that there was a real risk-of-not-prevailing issue in the
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Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, suggested an alternate
two-part test for evaluating contingency enhancements. 58 Under Justice
O'Connor's test, a fee petitioner must first "establish that 'without an
adjustment for risk the prevailing party would have faced substantial
difficulties in finding [competent] counsel in the local or other relevant
market.' ' ' 59 Next, the fee petitioner must demonstrate that "the market
rate of 'compensation ... for contingency fee cases as a class' was
different from cases in which payment was certain, win or lose."60
Although Justice O'Connor's lodestar enhancement properly focuses
on the contingent fee agreement, her proposal suffers from the same
problems as the hourly rate analysis under the conventional lodestar
procedure. By emphasizing the "local or other relevant market," Justice
O'Connor's test ignores the fact that contingent fee agreements are the
product of a market. As such, contingent fee agreements better reflect
fee agreements produced on that market and the value of the attorney
work product in a particular case.
Justice O'Connor's upward contingency adjustment factors were
proposed for adoption and rejected by the Supreme Court in City of
Burlington v. Dague.61 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, rejected
the use of the contingency fee to determine reasonable attorney's fees
under the lodestar method.62
We have established a "strong presumption" that the lodestar repre-
sents the "reasonable" fee .... The Court of Appeals held, and Dague
argues here, that a "reasonable" fee for attorneys who have been re-
tained on a contingency-fee basis must go beyond the lodestar, to
compensate for risk of loss and of consequent nonpayment. Fee-
shifting statutes should be construed, he contends, to replicate the
economic incentives that operate in the private legal market, where
attorneys working on a contingency-fee basis can be expected to
case, an upward adjustment of the lodestar may be made, but, as a general rule, in an
amount no more than one-third of the lodestar. Any additional adjustment would re-
quire the most exacting justification.
Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 730. Even the court's choice of a "one-third" limit on the up-
ward adjustment sounds ominously like a standard 33% contingency fee.
58. See Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 733-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, Justice
Blackmun has written, in a dissenting opinion to Dague, that, in enacting federal civil rights fee
shifting statutes, Congress "did not intend to prohibit district courts from considering contingency
in calculating a 'reasonable' attorney's fee." Dague, 505 U.S. at 570 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d 927, 935 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Delaware Valley, 483
U.S. at 733-34), vacated in part, 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1990)).
60. Id. (quoting Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 733-34). The Fifth Circuit has adopted
O'Connor's test.
61. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 574 (1992).
62. See id.
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charge some premium over their ordinary hourly rates.
63
Justice Scalia, however, assumed what he sets out to prove-that "the
lodestar represents the 'reasonable' fee."'64 Furthermore, Justice Scalia
dismissed the market for contingency fee claims, assuming that
attorneys' hourly rates are their "ordinary" rates.65  The fact is that
hourly rates are no more "ordinary" than contingency fee rates. The
market for fees in both market and contingency claims determines the
value of the attorney's work product and sets the price accordingly. 66
However, the renaissance of diversity among fee agreements between
attorneys, law firms, and their clients increasingly has pressured the
strict hourly fee lodestar to change.67  Indeed, some federal district
courts have already begun to stray from the strict lodestar approach by
giving the contingent fee agreement negotiated by the parties greater
weight in a courts' lodestar analysis.
Although the rule has long been that a percentage of damages may be
awarded as attorney's fees in cases involving the recovery of a common
fund, the percentage recovery approach has been employed with
increasing frequency in common fund cases.68  The District of
Columbia Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit require the rule's use.69  At
least five other circuits allow the use of either the lodestar approach or
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. Id. Yet such an assumption begs the question "what is reasonable?" It seems to be what
Justice Scalia terms it to be. See PLATO, supra note 1, at 54; supra note 2 and accompanying text
(discussing the majority rule that attorney's fees should be reasonable).
65. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 562. The contingency fee is not "some premium" additional to the
attorney's fee. See id.; see also Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 737. "In the private market, the
premium for contingency usually is recouped by basing the fee on a percentage of the damages
recovered. The premium could also be computed as part of an hourly rate that the lawyer bills
after the litigation succeeds." Delaware Valley, 483 U.S. at 737. The contingency fee is the at-
torney's fee recoverable on the market for contingency fee claims. See infra notes 87-88 and ac-
companying text.
66. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text (discussing the administrative burdens the
lodestar method imposes on federal courts).
67. See 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 2675.1. Wright noted:
The judicial analysis of what constitutes a reasonable fee is multi-faceted and dramatic
changes regarding the handling of fee applications have occurred in the past few years.
The calculation of attorney's fees in statutory fee awards has been refined through sev-
eral Supreme Court decisions. In addition, there has been a shift away from the lode-
star calculation and back to a percentage-of-recovery analysis in cases in which attor-
ney's fees are premised on the recovery of a common fund.
Id.
68. See In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 886 F. Supp. 445, 459 (E.D.
Pa. 1995).
69. See Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Camden I Con-
dominium Ass'n v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 774 (11 th Cir. 1991).
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the percentage recovery approach. 70  Additionally, the Fifth Circuit,
although purporting to use only the lodestar approach, has seen its
district courts apply the percentage recovery in combination with the
lodestar with increasing frequency. 71 Moreover, while the percentage
of recovery approach is supposed to be limited to common fund and
class action cases, 72 the Seventh Circuit stated that district courts have
discretion in the decision to apply a percentage method in other
instances.73
In the Fifth Circuit, despite the warning in Johnson that the "criterion
for the court is not what the parties agreed but what is reasonable," 74
district courts frequently award contingency percentage awards from
common funds recovered in litigation.75 In order to ensure a reasonable
percentage, however, courts continue to apply the Johnson factors.76 In
70. See In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir.
1994); Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Properties, 9 F.3d 513, 515-17 (6th Cir. 1993); Harman v.
Lyphomed, Inc., 945 F.2d 969, 974-75 (7th Cir. 1991); Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp.,
925 F.2d 518, 526 n.10 (1st Cir. 1991).
71. See Longden v. Sunderman, 979 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Combustion, Inc.,
968 F. Supp. 1116, 1135 (W.D. La. 1997), aff'd without opinion, 159 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998);
Garza v. Sporting Goods Properties, Inc., No. SA-93-1082, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2009 at *92
n.35 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
The percentage of recovery approach has been used with more frequency in common
fund cases. The District of Columbia Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit require its use.
Four other circuits, the Ninth, Sixth, First, and Seventh allow the court to use either the
lodestar or percentage approach. The Fifth Circuit appears to be staying with the lode-
star.
Garza, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2009 at *97 n.35 (citations omitted). Although the Third Circuit
has not officially adopted the percentage recovery for common fund cases, its district courts have
adopted the method. See, e.g., In re U.S. Bioscience Sec. Litig., 1555 F.R.D. 116, 118 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
72. Compare In re Combustion, Inc., 968 F. Supp. at 1135, and In re Catfish Antitrust Litig.,
939 F. Supp. 493, 500 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (citing numerous cases involving common funds and
class actions), with In re Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. Secs. Litig., No. Civ. A. 95-3925, 1998 WL
832574, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 25, 1998) ("[It] seems that a district court in the Fifth Circuit may
exercise discretion in determining whether to apply the percentage fee or lodestar method.").
73. See Harman, 945 F.2d at 975.
74. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
75. See In re Catfish, 939 F. Supp. at 500 (citing numerous cases that awarded contingency
percentage awards).
76. See id. In Garza, the Western District of Texas reviewed a class action settlement and the
accompanying award of attorney's fees. See Garza, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2009 at *92. The
court noted: "In a common fund case, 'a litigant or lawyer who recovers a common fund for the
benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee from
the fund as a whole."' Id. (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)).
In a footnote, the court noted that the Fifth Circuit "appears to be staying with the lodestar" de-
spite the fact that other circuits have turned to a percentage method of awarding attorney's fees.
Id. at *92 n.35. The court then underwent a thorough lodestar analysis including application of
the 12 Johnson factors. See id. at *93-125. In the end, the court arrived at an award of attorney's
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other words, although these courts have allowed the recovery of
percentage awards in common fund cases, they also apply the lodestar
method to ensure "the reasonableness" of the amount.77 Consequently,
most applicants seeking attorney's fees submit their lodestar application
and analysis to arrive at and support the contingency fee percentage.
Thus, the lodestar method seems to be simply a default method with
which the courts are left to deal.78
As litigation has become more costly, clients have demanded
increasing flexibility in the way they negotiate and arrange fee
agreements for legal services with attorneys. This demand has resulted
in variegated contingent fee agreements and combinations of contingent
fee and hourly fee agreements on the market for legal services where the
simple hourly fee agreement was once the rule. The federal courts are
being asked why they consider percentage fee agreements in "common
fund" cases only, and not in direct injury cases brought on a contingent
fee arrangement. 7
9
C. Shortcomings of the Lodestar Method
The lodestar method of calculating attorney's fees contains both
administrative and evaluative problems. First, the lodestar creates
administrative problems because the method places an inordinate
administrative burden on the courts in the form of attorney's fee award
litigation. Second, the lodestar generates evaluative problems because it
does not accurately value attorney work product according to the
relevant market for attorney's fees. Both of these problems can be
addressed by incorporating market analysis of contingent legal fees into
fees to class counsel in the amount of $12.8 million. See id. at *120-21. The class counsel had
sought an award based on a contingency fee in the amount of $13.5 million. See id. at *98.
77. See In re Combustion, 968 F. Supp. at 1135; In re Catfish, 939 F. Supp. at 493. One court
held:
It is the opinion of this Court that in common fund cases such as the instant case, Fifth
Circuit precedent requires a district court only to justify its award of attorneys' fees
within the framework of the Johnson factors regardless of whether the award is deter-
mined by the lodestar or percentage of fund method. Further, a district court may ex-
ercise its discretion as to whether the fee evaluation more reasonably fits into a per-
centage of fund or into a lodestar calculation as long as either selection is supported by
Johnson factor analysis.
In re Combustion, 968 F. Supp. at 1135.
78. See Lester Brickman, ABA Regulations of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 247 (1996) (providing a "case study of self-regulation in a specific
context: contingency fees").
79. See, e.g., Brown v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing
the application of the percentage fee to common fund cases and the lodestar to statutory shifting
fee cases).
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the lodestar equation. Indeed, the contingent fee market provides a
ready and accurate valuation of the attorney's work product, without the
administrative cost to judicial resources.
1. Administrative Problems
The lodestar method of calculating attorney's fees places a significant
burden on the courts and taxes judicial resources. Although a "second
major litigation" should not arise from a request for attorney's fees, 80
some litigation over attorney's fees is unavoidable. 81  This is because
the lodestar method requires courts to re-examine and re-litigate the
case from the standpoint of the attorney's work product and attorney's
fees. The party seeking attorney's fees has an incentive to maximize the
fees by exaggerating the amount of work and the magnitude of success
enjoyed in the prosecution of the case. The party resisting payment of
attorney's fees has an incentive to unfairly downplay the amount of
work and disparage the resulting success of the party prosecuting the
case.
82
The Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Court Awarded
Attorney Fees ("Third Circuit Task Force Report"), which identified
nine deficiencies of the lodestar approach, emphasized the
administrative problems of the lodestar method. 83 First, the analysis
80. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
81. This is because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 requires that the party seeking attor-
neys' fees submit a request for fees and litigate the issue. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). "On request
of a party or class member, the court shall afford an opportunity for adversary submissions with
respect to the motion in accordance with Rule 43(e) or Rule 78." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C).
"The court shall find the facts and state its conclusions of law as provided in Rule 52(a), and a
judgment shall be set forth in a separate document." FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(C).
82. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The Hensley Court observed: "The parties disagree as to the
results obtained in this case. Petitioners believe that respondents 'prevailed only to an extremely
limited degree.' Respondents contend that they 'prevailed on practically every claim ad-
vanced' . . . . [W]e leave this dispute for the District Court on remand." Id. at 432 n.6 (citations
omitted).
83. The Third Circuit Task Force identified nine deficiencies of the lodestar approach:
(1) [the process] increases the workload of an already overtaxed judicial system ... (2)
the elements of [the process] are insufficiently objective and produce results that are
far from homogeneous... (3) [the process] creates a sense of mathematical precision
that is unwarranted in terms of the realities of the practice of law... (4) [the process]
is subject to manipulation by judges who prefer to calibrate fees in terms of percent-
ages of the settlement fund or the amounts recovered by the plaintiffs or of an overall
dollar amount ... (5) [the process] leads to other abuses ... (6) [the process] creates a
disincentive for the early settlement of cases... (7) [the process] does not provide the
district court with enough flexibility to reward or deter lawyers so that desirable objec-
tives, such as early settlement will be fostered ... (8) [the process] works to the par-
ticular disadvantage of the public interest bar... and (9) considerable confusion and
lack of predictability remain in its administration.
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under the lodestar is more burdensome than a contingent fee evaluation.
Litigation over attorney's fees can become both more complicated and
more time consuming than the underlying lawsuit because the analysis
of the hourly fees requires the submission of time records prepared by
the attorneys and comparison to fees in the relevant market. 84 Indeed,
the failure of attorneys to present detailed time records of hours
expended may lead to denial or reduction of the fee requested.85
Moreover, in the most complex forms of litigation, the lodestar method
may require the court to scrutinize the "prevailing rates charged in the
community for similar work, the availability of adequate local counsel,
customary billing rates, the experience of the attorney[s], and the
complexity of the work" to determine hourly rates for lawyers with
varying expertise, doing different work in different parts of the
country. 86 Likewise, underlying lawsuits, which present multiple and
distinctly different claims for relief, further increase and complicate the
burden upon the court to determine which claims were meritorious and
which deserved enhancement under the lodestar method.87
Rehashing the work performed on the case along with the
accompanying representation of the hourly market of fees creates a
significant burden on the courts and an inefficient use of scarce judicial
resources. The analysis of the contingent fee market, on the other hand,
does not require the submission of time records, only the submission of
the contingency fee agreement. The market determines the
reasonableness of this fee agreement and the court will determine the
amount of recovery for each claim by the merits of the prosecution of
that claim.88
Report of Third Circuit Task Force: Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 246-49
(1985).
84. See Berger, supra note 3, at 292.
85. See 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 2675.1.
86. Id.
87. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35.
88. Of course, the market for claims accommodates different types of claims. Although an
antitrust claim differs significantly in many important aspects from a personal injury claim, the
function of the market is the same for each. Antitrust claims involve a specialized substantive
law, and the market for antitrust claims, antitrust attorneys and antitrust firms is specialized ac-
cordingly. The substantive law creates a demand for certain claims as they arise, and that demand
is met with the supply of lawyers practicing that type of law. Where claims arise in various juris-
dictions, such as personal injury claims, differences in state and local law and practice create lo-
calized markets for such claims. Where the substantive law governing claims are not limited
geographically, the market for such claims tends to be unlimited geographically as well. Antitrust
claims, for example, which are not limited by state borders or local lines, may require that law-
yers specializing in antitrust be retained to prosecute claims from across vast distances.
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In addition, federal courts do not apply the lodestar method
uniformly. The resulting chaotic state of law fosters an excessive
amount of litigation concerning the proper fee amount. 89 At times,
appellate courts may apply the Johnson factors differently than trial
courts. The inevitable consequence of the lodestar procedure is the
burgeoning of attorney's fee litigation on both the appellate and the trial
court levels. For example, courts differ as to which hours may be
included in computing the lodestar figure-sometimes including time
spent in preparing the fee application itself.90 Courts apply varying
standards of reasonableness, leading to divergent decisions regarding
attorney's fees. Accordingly, the varying standards prevent parties from
planning for and providing for the award of attorney's fees and
increases litigation over the varying standards.91
2. Evaluative Problems
Perhaps the more important problem with the lodestar method is that
it does not accurately value the attorney's work product. Regardless of
the number of factors considered by the courts, no precise formula for
computing attorney's fees exists. 92 This lack of precision imbues the
lodestar method with an unhealthy dose of subjectivity as courts vary in
the weight or consideration given to each factor. 93 The lodestar method,
further, offers "no guidance on the relative importance of each factor,
whether they are to be applied differently in different contexts, or,
indeed, how they are to be applied at all."'94  Likewise, the lodestar
89. See Berger, supra note 3, at 292.
90. See 10 WRIGHT ET. AL, supra note 14, § 2675.1.
Some fee opinions also suggest various categories of legal work into which the time
record should be subdivided. A listing of some of the factors reviewed by the courts
when setting fees illustrates the wide array of things considered. These include the
reasonableness of the time expended, the results obtained or benefit conferred, equita-
ble considerations, and delays in payment.
Id.
91. One commentator noted:
To prevent [contingency fee] windfalls would require much more extensive judicial
oversight of the fee system and might embroil judges in detailed inquiries into the
amounts of work actually performed in winning large awards. It is far from clear that
avoiding excessive fees would be worth the added time and cost of forcing heavily
burdened judges to conduct such investigations.
Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal for Contingency Fee
Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173, 180 n.31 (1995) (quoting BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING
CONTINGENcY FEES 27-28 (1994)).
92. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.
93. See Berger, supra note 3, at 293.
94. Id. at 286-87.
[Vol. 31
2000] Analysis of the Valuation of Attorney Work Product 617
method often flies in the face of the proposition that an attorney should
recover a fully compensatory fee, where a plaintiff has achieved his or
her desired results.9
5
Yet after over twenty years of applying these factors and achieving
poor results, these factors remain. Instead of giving various weight and
consideration to the Johnson factors, the market itself provides a more
accurate determination of the degree to which claims were successful.
Nevertheless, in Hensley v. Eckerhart, the Supreme Court struggled
with determining the degree of success on which to base attorney's
fees. 96  The problem facing the Supreme Court is how to determine
''reasonable fees" based on the attorney's work product and the
attorney's success without any objective valuation of that work or
success.97  The market for legal claims, however, has already made a
determination of the value and merit of the claim, and this is tested by
the prosecution of the claim and trial or settlement. Through the
contingent fee arrangement, the "critical factor" of the "degree of
success" necessarily calculates the attorney's fee based on the success
of the claim.
The Third Circuit Task Force Report emphasized the unwarranted
sense of precision and the inherent subjectivity of the lodestar method in
its critique.98 Since the publication of the Third Circuit Task Force
Report, federal courts have acknowledged and grappled with the lack of
mathematical precision. 99 Instead of tapping the legal market for
services to determine the market price for those services, the lodestar
method requires that the trial court simulate the market for attorney's
95. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435.
96. See id. at 435. The Court remarked:
If, on the other hand, a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the prod-
uct of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly
rate may be an excessive amount. This will be true even where the plaintiff's claims
were interrelated, nonfrivolous, and raised in good faith. Congress has not authorized
an award of fees whenever it was reasonable for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit or when-
ever conscientious counsel tried the case with devotion and skill. Again, the most
critical factor is the degree of success obtained.
Id. at 436.
97. See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 868 ("Of course, to say that a percentage contingent fee
must be 'reasonable' provides no guidance to lawyers and judges who must apply that standard in
particular circumstances.").
98. Report of Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 83, at 246-47. Specifically, the Third Cir-
cuit Task Force notes that the "process creates a sense of mathematical precision that is unwar-
ranted in terms of the realities of the practice of law" and that the process is "subject to manipu-
lation by judges who prefer to calibrate fees in terms of percentages of the settlement fund or the
amounts recovered by the plaintiffs or of an overall dollar amount." Id.
99. See id.
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fees and make an artificial economic finding of reasonable attorney's
fees. The valuation of the attorney's work product under the contract is
not "manipulation," as it is termed by the Third Circuit. Rather it is the
actual value of the attorney's work product based on an objective and
real world valuation. 100
The lodestar method mixes the markets for hourly rates and
contingent fees, rather than exclusively utilizing one or the other.
Indeed, the lodestar method's "preoccupation with attorneys' time and
market rates encourages the expenditure of excessive or unnecessary
hours."'' The Fifth Circuit noted that the hourly rate approach
"equates professional services to those of laborers and mechanics."' 10 2
The Fifth Circuit further observed a "flash of brilliance by a trial lawyer
may be worth far more to his clients than hours or days of plodding
effort."' 1 3 In essence, the lodestar method ignores the value placed on
the attorney's work product by the market itself.
The lodestar method ignores the fact that, in addition to legal
services, a contingent fee arrangement also provides credit and.legal-
cost insurance 1 4 Accordingly, "in the private market, lawyers charge a
100. See infra Part IV (suggesting that the attorney's work product valuation and benefits be-
come part of the lodestar method of calculating and awarding attorney's fees).
101. Report of Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 83, at 262. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 54 requires that the parties submit time records as part of their request for attorney's fees.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C); see also Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors, Co., 684 F.2d 1087,
1094 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled by J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 790 F.2d 1193 (5th
Cir. 1986); Berger, supra note 3, at 292 ("A second consequence of the chaotic state of the law is
an excessive amount of litigation concerning the proper fee amount."). Thus, the lodestar re-
quires that the court re-examine and re-litigate the case from the standpoint of the attorney's fees.
The Third Circuit Task Force noted that the emphasis on hours worked "creates a disincentive for
the early settlement of cases" and "gives attorneys an incentive to accumulate hours spent on the
case" in order to inflate recoverable fees. Report of Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 83, at
247-48. The party seeking attorney's fees has an incentive to maximize attorney fees by exagger-
ating the amount of work and the magnitude of success enjoyed in the prosecution of the case.
The party resisting payment of attorney's fees has an incentive to unfairly downplay the amount
of work and disparage the resulting success of the party prosecuting the case. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, however, rejected the argument that the lodestar method should not be used because it is in-
efficient and burdensome reasoning that: (1) the lodestar process responds to concerns that a per-
centage approach resulted in over-compensation for attorneys; (2) the lodestar process and use of
multipliers provides a means of accounting for the hours and rate reasonable in the type of case
and for the risk an attorney assumes in undertaking the case; and (3) the lodestar process encour-
ages attorneys to assess the marginal value of continuing to work on the case. See Harman v. Ly-
ophomed, Inc., 945 F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1991).
102. Foster v. Boise Cascade, Inc., 577 F.2d 335, 337 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978).
103. Id.
104. See Richard W. Painter, Symposium on Fee Shifting: Litigating on a Contingency: A Mo-
nopoly of Champions or a Market for Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 653 (1995).
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premium when their entire fee is contingent on winning."105 Courts,
nonetheless, cling to hourly rates in a legal marketplace that has seen
something of a renaissance in the ways attorneys and clients contract fee
agreements. Despite the adherence to the lodestar method of calculating
attorney fees, the use of contingency fee arrangements, though still most
prevalent in personal injury litigation, has spread to antitrust litigation,
shareholder derivative suits, patent litigation, mergers and acquisitions,
securities litigation, and even lobbying. 10
6
The evaluative problems created by the lodestar method of
calculating attorney's fees further lead to increased agency costs. By
importing the hourly rates into the contingency fee valuation, the courts
import the problems with charging client's hourly fees without any
accompanying evaluative benefit. Although courts may be able to
recognize thoroughly superfluous and unnecessary work, the lodestar
method, because it focuses upon hourly rates rather than results, creates
an incentive to maximize time spent on a plaintiff's case.10 7  This, in
turn, may create a disincentive for the early settlement of cases.10 8
105. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 735 (1987).
106. See Donald L. Abraham, Investor Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove Two Barri-
ers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1297 (1992); Painter,
supra note 104, at 626.
107. See 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1803. The Third Circuit Task Force further il-
lustrates this problem by emphasizing that "the process leads to other abuses; and ... the process
creates a disincentive for the early settlement of cases.. Report of Third Circuit Task Force,
supra note 83, at 247-48. In his concurrence to Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), Jus-
tice Brennan articulated similar concerns:
Within the confines of individual cases, from prevailing plaintiffs' point of view, ap-
pellate litigation of attorney's fee issues increases the delay, uncertainty, and expense
of bringing a civil rights case, even after the plaintiffs have won all the relief they de-
serve. Defendants-who generally have deeper pockets than plaintiffs or their law-
yers, and whose own lawyers may well be salaried and thus have lower opportunity
costs than plaintiffs' counsel-have much to gain simply by dragging out litigation.
The longer litigation proceeds, with no prospect of improved results, the more pressure
plaintiffs and their attorneys may feel to compromise their claims or simply to give up.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 455-56 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. See Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, supra note 83, at 246-49. The Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force notes that the process "does not provide the district court with enough
flexibility to reward or deter lawyers so that desirable objectives, such as early settlement, will be
fostered .... [Clonsiderable confusion and lack of predictability remain in its administration."
Id. at 248-29. Justice Brennan observed:
In systemic terms, attorney's fee appeals take up lawyers' and judges' time that could
more profitably be devoted to other cases, including the substantive civil ights claims
that § 1988 was meant to facilitate. Regular appellate scrutiny of issues like those in
this case also generates a steady stream of opinions, each requiring yet another to har-
monize it with the one before or the one after. Ultimately, § 1988's straightforward
command is replaced by a vast body of artificial, judge-made doctrine, with its own ar-
cane procedures, which like a Frankenstein's monster meanders its well-intentioned
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Utilizing hourly rates can create disincentives for providing an efficient
work product to clients and consumers of the market for legal services.
"The high degree of subjectivity involved in most fee decisions is
unhealthy for both the legal profession and for the conduct of
litigation."' 0 9 No matter how many factors the courts consider or how
they weigh each in their consideration, "[t]here is no precise rule or
formula for making these determinations."' 10 "Where a plaintiff has
obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully
compensatory fee." ' Instead of applying factors and disagreeing as to
their weight in consideration, it should be left to the market to determine
which claims were successful and how successful they were.
III. REFORMULATING THE LODESTAR TO INCORPORATE THE MARKET FOR
LEGAL CLAIMS AND ATTORNEY FEES
Both the administrative and evaluative problems of the lodestar can
be addressed by incorporating the market for legal claims and attorney's
fees into the lodestar calculation. The market for legal claims
encompasses both the factors that the federal court considers in
determining attorney's fees and the factors that burden the federal court
in administrative determinations and costs.
A. The Market for Legal Claims
Like a mineral interest or a patent, a legal claim is considered a
property interest.11 2 In most jurisdictions, with some exceptions, 1 3 a
way through the legal landscape leaving waste and confusion (not to mention circuit
splits) in its wake.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 455 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Berger, supra note 3, at 293.
110. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436.
11. Id. at 435.
112. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.014 (West 2000); Grace Robotics, Inc. v. Oaklawn
Bank, 914 S.W.2d 633, 639 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a litigant may assign his interest in
a breach of contract action); see also Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the
Economists: An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and
Political System, 70 TEX. L. REV. 645, 676 (1992) (noting the wealth building effects of lawyer's
practices and the "Productive, Economically Facilitating Activities" of lawyers).
113. In some jurisdictions, medical and legal malpractice claims may not be assigned. See,
e.g., Schroeder v. Hudgins, 690 P.2d 114, 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a legal mal-
practice claim was not assignable); Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 459 So. 2d 1148,
1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam) ("[W]e cannot permit enforcement of a legal mal-
practice action which has been transferred by assignment."); Clement v. Prestwich, 448 N.E.2d
1039, 1042 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (concluding that a legal malpractice claim was not assignable);
Moorhouse v. Ambassador Ins. Co., Inc., 383 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing
that assigning a legal malpractice claim is barred).
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legal claim is defeasible and subject to assignment. A contingency fee
is an interest in that property claim. Accordingly, principles from
property law should be observed by courts in dealing with contingency
fee interests, legal claims and attorney's fees. Indeed, the law relating
to property interests in oil and gas or patents provides a better legal
framework for analysis of attorney's fees and a better model for courts
to follow in ascertaining and awarding attorney's fees than that
provided by the Model Rules. These bodies of law provide economic
principles upon which economic models can be constructed, analyzed
and anchored in economically based public policy considerations. The
same cannot be said for the rules of disciplinary procedure.11 4
Just as there is a market for any property interest, there is a
corresponding market for legal claims and contingent attorney's fee
interests.1 15 Fee arrangements are typically determined privately
114. "Of course, to say that a percentage contingent fee must be 'reasonable' provides no
guidance to lawyers and judges who must apply that standard in particular circumstances. DR 2-
106(B) lists factors courts should consider in determining the reasonableness of a fee; one factor
is '[wlhether the fee is fixed or contingent."' Drummonds, supra note 23, at 868; see supra note 8
(detailing the factors under DR 2-106(B)).
Implied in an attorney's fee award is that something in legal claims and contingency fees needs
to be disciplined. Yet every attempt to "discipline" attorney's fees based on ethics and the pro-
fessional responsibility of lawyers strays decidedly from principles of economics and law and
economics analysis. See Horowitz, supra note 91, at 183. The result is the sound of lawyers
beating their chests. "Although some judges, media people, and the defense bar have character-
ized attorney's fees as a source of abuse and a stain on the escutcheon of the administration of
civil justice, in reality there is a virtual absence of empiric data showing any significant incidence
of excessive fees." 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
1803 (1986). Why do courts treat their own purveyors differently? The answers to the question
seem to lie somewhere between a vague duty to regulate the profession and the public's obsession
with lawyers and attorney's fees. "Yet, as with other legal issues, it is within the covers of law
reviews and specialty journals in economics that much of the debate over the social utility of
various tort rules and their reform takes place." John C. Moorehouse et al., Law & Economics
and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REv. 667, 667 (1998). One commen-
tator remarked:
My personal view is that many cases which are brought by lawyers operating with
contingent fee contracts have enabled plaintiffs to secure a measure of justice which
would otherwise have been difficult or impossible to obtain. I have seen many cases
that support that belief. So, in a general sense, the prohibition of contingent fee con-
tracts as a method of financing litigation is a difficult argument to make. The more dif-
ficult questions are whether the attorney-client contingent fee relationship needs to be
supervised or regulated and, if so, by whom and in what form.
Charles Kocoras, Contingent Fees-A Judge's Perch, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 421, 421 (1998).
115. See Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy For Tort Reform, 12
YALE J. ON REG. 435, 443 (1995) (proposing "a market for the sale and exchange of tort claims");
Gergen, supra note 11, at 1010 (using "an oil and gas lease as an example, though much of the
analysis could as well apply to other familiar contracts, including exclusive-listing contracts with
real estate brokers to sell homes, contingent-fee contracts for legal services, and book-publishing
contracts").
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between attorney and client. 116 The market for legal claims prices the
legal claim on the basis of the required attorney work product and
expertise as well as the actual merits of the particular claim.
The value of a given claim would be determined by the expected
recovery from the claim. Thus, the claim holder will negotiate with
attorneys with varying levels of ability, and those with the most
expertise and experience may attract the most valuable claims and
command a greater portion of the expected return. 117  Conversely,
lesser-qualified attorneys will command lesser, though proportionate,
fee percentages in their fee agreements and will attract less valuable
claims. Likewise, attorneys will pay for a given claim according to
what they think it will be worth, though they may differ as to their
assessment of the value of a given claim. The competition for the claim
creates a market for legal claims that factors in the risk accompanying
the claim into the market price. 118  Therefore, by the time the fee
agreement is executed, the market for legal claims has already valued
the legal claim and the accompanying attorney's fees. The best way for
a court to value the attorney's work product for an award of attorney's
fees is to use the market for the attorney's work product already in
place.
116. See Berger, supra note 3, at 283 (examining the "Current State of the Law" 22 years ago
regarding court-awarded attorney's fees and identifying the same problems 22 years ago as to-
day).
117. "The contingency fee offers 'a key to the courthouse door' to some persons with valid
claims." 2 STEVEN E. PAGALIS & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE § 1:5 (1980) (quoting William B. Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Dam-
ages and Deterrence: An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 NEW ENG. L. MED. 1282,
1288 (1978)); see also Vicki Giotkin Adler, Lawyers' Fees: A Cornucopia For Client Com-
plaints, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 71, 84 (1987) ("The contingent fee, when properly used, is a valuable
social and legal device."); Eric M. Rhein, Judicial Regulation of Contingent Fee Contracts, 48 J.
AIR L. & COM. 151, 155-58 (1982) (presenting a history of the contingent fee contract in the
United States); Jeffrey L. Parker, Note, Contingent Expert Witness Fees: Access and Legitimacy,
64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1363, 1374 (1991) (proposing nonpercentage contingency fees for expert wit-
nesses' fees).
118. Like every other market, the market for claims is not a perfect market. There are barriers
of entry and limitations on supply in the form of state bar licensing, and the demand for the mar-
ket for claims is created by the substantive law. Although many of the limitations on the market
for claims are unavoidable in any market for professional services, these limitations can be used
to adjust the market for optimum performance. Consider the legal claims that arise when a duty
established by the substantive law is breached. Limiting or expanding substantive causes of ac-
tion, for example, can provide consumers with additional or fewer rights in the business environ-
ment. The result is more or less claims and demand for attorneys. Similarly, limiting or expand-
ing licensure for attorneys can provide the market for claims with additional or fewer choices of
legal counsel. Accordingly, although the legal market for claims has limitations, it also has pos-
sibilities, and this Article explores only one of them.
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B. Proposed Legal Claims Analysis Under Oil and Gas Law Principles
As noted above, a mineral interest in an oil and gas lease is a property
interest.1 9 Under an oil and gas lease, the oil and gas operator and the
property interest owner enter into agreement to drill for and produce oil
and gas from the property. Like the attorney and client with regard to
their legal claim, the mineral interest owner and the oil and gas operator
form a joint venture for production from the property interest in
question. 120
The operator provides his expertise, training and industry to develop
the property interest of the mineral interest owner. They sign a contract,
account for expenses, and the mineral interest owner receives
production royalty less these expenses. If there is no recovery for the
oil and gas operator, there is no recovery for the mineral interest owner.
There are no limitations on recovery by either joint venturer. The oil
and gas operator and mineral interest owner pool their risk. There are
no reasonableness limits on the production under prevailing oil and gas
law principles. In this way, the law creates an incentive for the operator
to efficiently utilize his expertise and training to maximize production
of the minerals for the benefit of the mineral interest owner. These
incentives, furthermore, limit or restrict agency costs.
Similarly, in the attorney-client relationship, the attorney enters into a
joint venture relationship to maximize the client's claim. The attorney
provides expertise, training and industry to develop the property interest
of the client. They sign a contract, account for expenses, and the client
receives production recovery less these expenses. Under a contingency
arrangement, if the client recovers nothing, so too does the attorney.
The attorney and client pool their risk.
119. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (comparing legal claims to interests in miner-
als or patents).
120. "Contingent-fee arrangements alternatively could be viewed as joint ventures whereby
lawyers, instead of conducting litigation only for clients' benefit, agree with clients to litigate for
their mutual benefit. Clients would contribute their claims to the ventures, and lawyers would
contribute their time, putting both at risk." Painter, supra note 104, at 655 n.145. "Such risk
sharing by lawyers and clients obviously increases the likelihood that plaintiffs will prosecute
their claims." Id. at 654-44. Although in some jurisdictions such a relationship is not considered
to be a joint venture arrangement by law, it acts functionally as one in every state. See generally
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7 (1996) (explaining that the receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business); UNIF. REVISED
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 2.02 (1996) (equating "partnership" with "joint venture"); Id. at § 2.03
(1996) (setting forth factors to determine "joint venture," such as the "right to receive a share of
profits of the business," "expression of an intent to be partners in the business," "participation or
right to participate in control of the business," and "sharing or agreeing to share ... losses of the
business..."),
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In the attorney-client relationship, however, there are limitations on
recovery. There are reasonableness limits on the production under
prevailing law of attorney's fees. In this way, the law creates a
disincentive for the attorney to efficiently utilize his expertise and
training to maximize production of the claim for the benefit of the
client. Without the artificial "reasonableness" limitation, the lawyer's
incentive is to maximize the value of the client's property, recovery for
his client's claim. 12 1 The opposing lawyer's incentive is converse.
Economics principles state that property resources should be maximized
because of scarcity. Disincentives to efficient recovery, whether it be
through trial or various forms of settlement, waste judicial resources and
provide a poor quality service to clients of the legal profession. The full
and efficient use of judicial resources should comport with the client's
interest in recovery for breach of a duty created by the substantive law.
If the lawyer's fees are limited, the lawyer's incentives and interests are
no longer in accord with those of the client.
"To achieve full enforcement of the private rights created by statutes
which include attorneys' fee provisions, the resources of the private bar
must be brought to bear."' 122 Although "no single fee arrangement can
perfectly align the interests of the lawyer with the interests of the client
in all circumstances[,]' ' 123 the great weight of scholarly opinion is that
contingent fee agreements do so better than any other fee
arrangement. 12
4
C. Proposed Legal Claims Analysis Under
Patent Property Law Principles
A patent holder is also the owner of a property interest. The holder
of the patent may sell the patent on the market, or may sell rights to use
of the patent for payment of royalties. The value of the patent is
determined by its utility and efficiency in its utilization of scarce
resources. Patents are sold and valued on the free market; their use is
protected by law; there are no artificial "reasonableness" restraints on
121. Under the principles of oil and gas law, there are implied covenants to prevent waste of
minerals and to protect the mineral interest owner from inefficient operators. The purpose of
these covenants is to fully develop and utilize societal resources.
122. Berger, supra note 3, at 313.
123. Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation, Settlement, and the Contingent Fee, 47 DEPAUL L.
REv. 363, 364 (1998).
124. See Bruce L. Hay, Contingent Fees and Agency Costs, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 508
(1996) (discussing principal-agent problems); Howard M. Tollin & Tammy Feman, Litigation
Management: What Legal Defense Costs Are Reasonable and Necessary, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 529,
536 (1996) (proposing auditing and surveillance of outside counsel and litigating defense costs to
dissuade future excessive costs).
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the use and profits accrued from patents. In this way, the market seeks
to ensure that the most efficient user of the patent will obtain the right to
put it to use. Courts allow and encourage the sale of patents and patent
owners to utilize their property as they see fit, protecting patent holder's
rights from trespass or infringement as an incentive to the creation of
further patents and the more efficient utilization of society's scarce
resources.
Some jurisdictions limit the assignability of legal claims. 125  The
holder of the claim may not sell the claim on the market, or the holder
of the claim may not sell the rights to the claim for monetary
compensation. This creates a serious problem in the legal market of
claims. The value of the claim should be determined by its merit and
the efficiency with which it can be prosecuted.
When claims are unrestricted, they can be sold and valued on the free
market and rights to the claims can be protected by law. Artificial
''reasonableness" restraints on the use and profits accrued from claims
distort the market and its valuation function. In this way, the market
can no longer ensure that the most efficient user or prosecutor of the
claim will obtain the right to put it to use. Where courts allow and
encourage the sale of patents and allow patent owners to utilize their
property as they see fit, courts retard similar assignments on the market
for contingent fee claims. The price for prosecuting the contingent fee
claim is not determined by its substantive merit, but by the
"reasonableness" factors and ethical standards. As a result, the market
for claims operates less efficiently in pricing the claim and less
efficiently in allocating scarce judicial resources.
D. Addressing Administrative Problems of the Lodestar Method With
the Market for Legal Claims
It seems only logical to award attorney's fees according to the type of
fee arrangement chosen by the parties. If the case is an hourly case, the
125. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hudgins, 690 P.2d 114 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that legal
malpractice claim is not assignable); Washington v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 459 So. 2d 1148
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same); Clement v. Prestwich, 448 N.E.2d 1039 (I11. App. Ct. 1983)
(same); Moorhouse v. Ambassador Ins. Co., Inc., 383 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (same).
One commentator noted:
A plausible argument might be that assignability would produce a more objective
valuation of claims by people who are specialists in such evaluations. After all, if the
present holder of a claim placed an unduly low value on it, there would be money to be
made from detecting this fact and purchasing the claim for a figure closer to its real
value. Indeed, a market-like valuation of one's claim might induce a downward re-
valuation by one who overvalues his cause of action.
Painter, supra note 104, at 634 n.41.
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attorney's fees should be determined on an hourly basis. If the case is
taken on a contingency, the attorney's fees should be determined on the
basis of the value the lawyer brings to the claim in accordance with the
contingency fee agreement. By deferring to the market for legal claims,
the trial court relieves itself of the artificial lodestar hourly valuations
and absolves itself of many of the lodestar's administrative problems.' 26
Even the harshest and most relentless critics of contingent fees and the
market for claims have to admit that the incorporation of the market for
contingent fees and legal claims would relieve a significant burden from
the courts.1 27 The recovery is in line with the fee. 128 The courts further
policies implemented in the substantive law, whether statutory or
common law. For example, courts in effect reduce the volume of injury
and socialize injury cost; courts enforce valid contracts between parties
that serve economic interests. In the end, the courts maximize the gross
social product. 129
Contingency fee agreements focus upon risks and results in a case,
rather than upon an artificial determination of whether the fee represents
standard practice or reasonableness. 130  Moreover, contingency fee
agreements create an incentive for attorneys to screen out weak or
gratuitous cases, thereby maximizing scarce judicial resources. 131
Finally, using the contingency fee agreement, rather than the lodestar
method, absolves the trial court of the problem of wildly inconsistent
attorney's fee awards because the trial court no longer creates artificial
markets. 132
126. See Choharis, supra note 115, at 479-92 (describing the advantages of a market for
claims).
127. See LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 24 (1994) (noting the
excessive costs to courts in determining appropriate fee arrangements on a case-by-case basis);
Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 383 (1989)
(arguing for the creation of a market of "unmatured tort claims" based on accidents that may oc-
cur in the future); Charles J. Goetz, Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort
Claims": Collateral Implications, 75 VA. L. REV. 413, 415 (1989) (displaying skepticism for
Cooter's hypotheses).
128. A commentator noted that "the lawyer in a [contingent fee agreement] is compensated
for accepting the risks inherent in the particular litigation, time spent on the case, and the loan
value of the lawyer's services. Accordingly, contingent fees are appropriately higher than regu-
larly hourly rates." Drummonds, supra note 23, at 864 n.23; see also RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 624 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing contingency fee contracts as a so-
lution to the "liquidity problem" many plaintiffs experience).
129. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
26 (1970).
130. See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 863.
131. See Rhein, supra note 117, at 155-58; Parker, supra note 117, at 1366 n.9.
132. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Prac-
tice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 302 (1998) (noting that "returns from contingency fee practice are
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E. Addressing the Evaluative Problems of the Lodestar Method Using
the Market for Legal Claims
Contingency fee agreements solve a problem plaguing the federal
courts since the lodestar's adoption in Hensley v. Eckerhart. The
precise issue facing the Supreme Court in Hensley was how the trial
court was to apportion attorney's fees among successful and
unsuccessful claims. 133 The parties, forbidden to utilize contingency fee
considerations, were left suggesting solutions to the problem that border
on the comical. 134  The Supreme Court introduced and adopted the
twelve lodestar enhancement factors, 135 seizing upon one of the factors
stating that "'the amount involved and the results obtained,' indicates
that the level of a plaintiff's success is relevant to the amount of fees to
be awarded."' 136  However, the lodestar does not solve the problem
presented in Hensley. The trial court's determination of how the
"results obtained" from various claims justify the hourly lodestar
calculation is explained only by emphasis upon the deference to the
district court's discretion. 37  Except for the additional twelve
enhancement factors, the district courts are left essentially where they
began.
The contingency fee solves the Hensley problem before it even arises.
That is because the attorney and client will agree to a percentage fee for
their claims, and different claims will recover different types of
damages, depending on the substantive law governing each. The
successful claims will recover damages ascertained by the fact finder,
and the contingency fee provides a measurement for the attorney's work
product in each. Therefore, the attorney's fee for different claims is
determined not by the issues or the ubiquitous discretion of the trial
at best 'somewhat' better" than in hourly practice).
133. "The issue in this case is whether a partially prevailing plaintiff may recover an attor-
ney's fee for legal services on unsuccessful claims." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 426
(1983).
134. See id. at 428. The Court held:
[Petitioners'] suggested method of calculating fees is based strictly on a mathematical
approach comparing the total number of issues in the case with those actually prevailed
upon. Under this method no consideration is given for the relative importance of vari-
ous issues, the interrelation of the issues, the difficulty in identifying issues, or the ex-
tent to which a party may prevail on various issues.
Id.
135. See id. at 430 n.3.
136. Id. at 430 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th
Cir. 1974)).
137. See id. "We reemphasize that the district court has discretion in determining the amount
of a fee award." Id. at 437.
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court. Rather, the attorney's fee is determined by the value of the claim
under its substantive law. Importantly, if a particular claim is only
partially successful, and it recovers some portion of damages, then the
contingency values the attorney's work product accordingly and
provides for the appropriate attorney's fee by apportioning a
proportionate amount. This apportionment is not provided for under the
lodestar method.
The rationales behind the acceptance of contingency fees vary. Most
commonly, proponents justify the use of contingency fees to provide
access to the judicial system to those who would otherwise not be able
to afford legal representation. 138  A second justification, however,
hypothesizes that contingency fees create incentives for attorneys,
whose compensation depends upon winning, to work harder for the
client. 139
As the legal market has changed over the past two decades, attorneys,
firms and their clients have made dramatic innovations in the way they
contract for fees. In addition to hourly fees, attorneys and clients
contract to handle cases based on set fees for a certain volume of cases,
mixed contingent and hourly fees, and simple contingency fee
agreements.
Today lawyers and their clients contract for fees in many innovative
and creative ways, and these innovations serve not only to provide
needed flexibility to the contracting parties, they provide an economic
benefit and improve the services clients can request and receive from
their attorneys. Therefore, the lodestar method's narrow focus on
hourly rates seems not only limited but outdated. 140  Finally, turning to
138. See Moorehouse et al., supra note 114, at 671, 692 (finding in a survey of law and eco-
nomics scholars that 80% either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that
"[p]ermitting attorneys to charge contingent fees is inefficient" with only 5% agreeing). The
public perception of attorneys and contingency fees is problematic because it misses a valuable
service that lawyers and the legal system provide society and the value of contingency fees has
never been recognized in law or economics literature. Courts provide a means of settling disputes
and enforcing contracts and binding agreements. As a means of dispute resolution on the free
market of legal services, enforcement of property rights is an economic necessity and valuable to
the economy. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 568 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). Blackmun argues that "[t]he strategy of the fee-shifting provisions is to attract compe-
tent counsel to selected federal cases by ensuring that if they prevail, counsel will receive fees
commensurable with what they could obtain in other litigation." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing justification of contingency fees).
140. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 114, § 1803. The author comments that:
[T]he notion that there are fixed hourly rates that can be attributed to all lawyers ... is
somewhat of an illusion. These rates have never existed for contingent fee lawyers,
since time and hourly rates are irrelevant for their type of practice .... Furthermore, at
present there is significant judicial disagreement regarding which hours may be in-
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hourly rate models for attorney's fees after clients receive access to the
courts through contingent fees serves as a disincentive for that form of
access. 141
Although contingent fee arrangements are criticized on the
assumption that "attorneys trade off time for returns that gradually
diminish with effort,"' 142 the fact that there are varying degrees of
qualifications of available lawyers to the contingent fee claimant
ensures that the market will respond to the value of the claim. In other
words, the market simply ensures that the expertise and quality of the
lawyer comports with the value, merit and fee accompanying the claim.
Contingency fees, by their very nature, provide attorneys with an
incentive to do a good job.143 Although "no single fee arrangement can
perfectly align the interests of the lawyer with the interests of the client
in all circumstances[,]"' 144 the great weight of scholarly opinion is that
contingent fee agreements do so better than any other fee
arrangement. 145  Moreover, by aligning the incentives of both the
lawyer and the client to match, the lack of sophistication of the client in
determining the value of the fee is addressed. Judge Posner, in fact,
contends that the existence of agency costs provides a rationale for
allowing the "outright sale of legal claims ... "146 In effect, the
contingent fee lawyer takes over the client's role and brings the
sophistication and expertise necessary to ensure the greatest recovery.
Both have an incentive to maximize their recovery. 1
47
cluded and which excluded. For example, there are decisions both ways on whether
time expended in preparing the fee application itself may be included, although the
clear weight of precedent is affirmative.
Id.
141. A major hurdle in obtaining adequate compensation for losses is the prevalence of pro-
hibitively high access fees. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 (stating that contingency fees "often .. . provide the
only practical means by which one having a claim can economically afford, finance and obtain
the services of a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim"); Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to
Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 241 (1998) (tracing historical support for contingency fees as a means of
allowing poor persons to assert their legal rights); Mnookin, supra note 123, at 364-66 (1998)
(addressing how bargaining power imbalances would be affected by eliminating the contingent
fee in favor of litigation insurance with fee shifting); Parker, supra note 117, at 1368.
142. Gergen, supra note 11, at 1016.
143. See POSNER, supra note 128, at 625.
144. Mnookin, supra note 123, at 364.
145. See Hay, supra note 124, at 503 (discussing principal-agent problems); Tollin & Feman,
supra note 124, at 536 (proposing auditing and surveillance of outside counsel and litigating de-
fense costs to dissuade future excessive costs).
146. POSNER, supra note 128, at 625.
147. See Moorehouse et al., supra note 114, at 691. One commentator noted: "Contingent
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Likewise contingency fees allow clients to pool their risk with
attorneys. The flip side of this pooling of risk is that attorneys are
placed in a better position to assess the risks and potential recovery of a
claim. Accordingly, the contingent fee award regulates the number of
meritless claims that are brought. 14
8
F. Ethical Issues Addressed by the Market for Legal Claims
Some commentators have posited that contingent fee agreements
create ethical problems because of the relationship between the attorney
and his lay client. 149 Some ethicists contend that a "client's voluntary
agreement alone should not suffice to establish the reasonableness of [a
contingent fee agreement].' 150  They argue that a reasonable fee,
regardless of any agreement, is one that awards the attorney the market
value of time and effort expended.151 These arguments, however,
ignore the prevalence of contingent fee agreements in other, presumably
fees improve risk sharing between client and attorney under the likely condition that the attorney
faces less risk arising from a case than does the client." Id. Furthermore:
The attorney has a portfolio of cases at any one time. Therefore, her earnings are not
determined by a single case. For every case in which she collects a low or zero contin-
gent fees, the attorney may collect an unusually attractive fee. In short, case diversifi-
cation reduces the risk an attorney faces. By contrast, a litigant may be involved in
only one major civil case in a lifetime. The outcome of the case can significantly af-
fect the client's wealth.
Id. at 691 n.138. Additionally,
by giving an attorney a stake in the outcome of a case, contingent fees partially solve
the principal-agent monitoring problem faced by clients. In particular, most clients
simply do not have the information or experience by which to determine whether they
are receiving the quantity and quality of legal service that is in their best interest.
Id. at 691.
148. See Drummonds, supra note 23, at 864-65.
149. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the
Prince of Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 32 (1989) (making the alarmingly sweeping and
poorly supported claim that "many contingent fees are invalid as a matter of ethics, policy, and
law since they are often used in situations where there is either no contingency or, although a
contingency exists, the contingent fee far exceeds any legitimate risk premium for the anticipated
effort").
150. Drummonds, supra note 23, at 868. One commentator noted, "Most prospective personal
injury or other tort plaintiffs lack the information necessary to make the 'free market model' an
efficient and fair mechanism in the legal marketplace, even under a 'law and economics' theory.
Moreover, such lack of information creates a dilemma in the theory of legal ethics." Id. at 869.
Another commentator observed that "the institutional conditions necessary to a competitive mar-
ket do not yet exist in the legal services context." Lester Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle:
Gagnon v. Shoblom, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1430 (1991); see also Udall v. Littell, 366 F.2d
668, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting that "the very making of a formal contract and its performance
impose a high duty on the attorney because he is dealing in an area in which he is expert and the
client must necessarily rely on the attorney").
151. See Berger, supra note 3, at 283.
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ethical, professions.' 52 Accountants, real estate agents and architects, to
name just a few, are all professions utilizing contingent fee agreements
with lay clientele. 153  Contingent fee agreements in these fora also
involve a professional with expertise regarding the work requested and
a client with none, but they do not require a judicial apparatus to police
these agreements. As the case with contingent fees for lawyers, a
market for services exists in each of these professions. 154
Some scholars and judges contend that a losing defendant should not
''pay for" other cases that the plaintiff's attorney has lost against other
152. Justice Blackmun remarked:
In enacting fee-shifting statutes, Congress stressed that the fee awarded must be 'ade-
quate to attract competent counsel, but.., not produce windfalls to attorneys.' Today,
a plurality of the Court ignores the fact that a fee that may be appropriate in amount
when paid promptly and regardless of the outcome of the case, may be inadequate and
inappropriate when its payment is contingent upon winning the case.
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 735 (1987) (Blackmun. J., dis-
senting) (citations omitted).
153. In addition, contrary to the arguments of tort reformers, who contend that the prevalence
of the "uniform" 33-40% contingent fee contract signals an absence of a market, the uniformity of
the fee-even a nonpercentage contingency fee-still creates a market for claims. See Parker.
supra note 117. at 1374-76. The uniformity of the fee at 33-40%, if anything, comports with the
requirement that the contingent fee be reasonable. The Model Codes Disciplinary Rule 2-106(A)
provides that a lawyer shall not "enter into an agreement for ... [a] clearly excessive fee."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1992). The market may exist
regardless of the uniformity of the percentage of the contingent fee charged. See Painter, supra
note 104, at 655-56 (discussing the market for claims based on variables besides price). "[Tihe
mere fact that lawyers dominate the market for legal services or champerty of litigation does not
necessarily make pricing anticompetitive." Id. at 656. "If lawyers compete against each other,
they may drive prices down to competitive levels." Id.; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Rhetoric and
Reality... Uses and Abuses... Contingencies and Certainties: The Political Economy of the
American Contingent Fee, WlSC. INST. FOR LEGAL STUD. (1995) (disputing the fact that plain-
tiffs' lawyers are overpaid).
154. One commentator stated:
[A]n attorney advising a prospective client about the most suitable fee agreement for
the client's particular case obviously may have an economic interest adverse to the cli-
ent. Short of requiring consultation with independent counsel as to the appropriateness
of a proposed [contingent fee agreement] in every case, there is no practical alternative
to permitting and requiring the attorney proposing or offering the [contingent fee
agreement] to advise the client, notwithstanding the possibility of a de facto conflict in
economic interest.
Drummonds, supra note 23, at 870. Furthermore:
Requiring clients to consult with Attorney B before signing a [contingent fee agree-
ment] with Attorney A would be one alternative guaranteeing economically disinter-
ested advice to the client about the [contingent fee agreement]. This would appear im-
practical, however, because clients would then have to pay the attorneys advising on
the [contingent fee agreement]. Further, such a prophylactic rule would impose new
administrative costs on the tort system.
Id. at 870 n.52.
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defendants. 155 This argument has no validity under either economics or
ethics principles. 156 To assert that losing defendants are paying for the
plaintiff's attorney to bring losing claims is to claim that there is no
market for attorney's fees. Even in a deficiently functioning market for
legal claims some would find recovery and others would not. These
nonrecoverable claims, however, do not make the market "unethical" or
"ethically invalid." The very fact that there is a functioning market
means that there will be claims that do not produce a recovery. The
function of the market is to separate and price the various value of these
claims. To assert that this means losing defendants are paying for
frivolous claims, however, is disingenuous at best. 157
Furthermore, the client may negotiate with a number of attorneys and
consider a number of fee offers before settling on one. In the
marketplace, in the process of considering other fee agreement offers
from various attorneys, it is almost inevitable that unsuitable offers will
be quickly weeded out by competition. As part of that competition, the
prospective client will receive advice regarding the unattractiveness of
other, unsuitable offers. It is not true, therefore, that "only the lawyer
taking the case-who frequently will have a potential economic conflict
of interest-can realistically advise the client on the most appropriate
fee arrangement in the circumstances of the case."' 158 Nothing prevents
155. "The argument that 'pooling' the risks in client cases is standard practice and thus rea-
sonable, however, suffers from several deficiencies." Id. at 873. "A license to practice law does
not justify, in effect, taking more of a client's recovery than the particular case justifies and di-
verting that money to the cases of other clients whose claims are less worthy." Id. at 874. The
Supreme Court noted: "An attorney operating on a contingency-fee basis pools the risks pre-
sented by his various cases: cases that turn out to be successful pay for the time he gambled on
those that did not." City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 565 (1992).
156. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-389 (1994).
"It is ethical to charge a contingent fee as long as the fee is appropriate and reasonable and the
client has been fully informed of the availability of alternative billing arrangements." Id. at 1. "It
is not necessarily unethical to charge a contingent fee when liability is clear and some recovery is
anticipated. A lawyer compensated on a contingent basis has no obligation to solicit on behalf of
the client an early settlement offer." Id. at 15. The American Bar Association confirms that there
are two ways to value the lawyers' services: One is according to the market that pays him ac-
cording to his time; the other is according to the value he brings to the claim. See id.
157. Justice Blackmun noted:
Even the least meritorious case in which the attorney is guaranteed compensation
whether he wins or loses will be economically preferable to the most meritorious fee-
bearing claim in which the attorney will be paid only if he prevails, so long as the cases
require the same amount of time. Yet ... this latter kind of case-in which potential
plaintiffs can neither afford to hire attorneys on a straight hourly basis nor offer a per-
centage of a substantial damages recovery-is exactly the kind of case for which the
fee-shifting statutes were designed.
Dague, 505 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
158. Drummonds, supra note 23, at 870.
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the client from receiving advice from competitors regarding their fee
offers and arrangements, and this advice is encouraged by the market.
Attorneys and clients with claims negotiate and the client shops for
the attorney with which he is most comfortable. Both attorney and
client have an incentive to maximize the value of the claim. Risk is
factored into the price. Sometimes, however, the attorney and client
may not assess a claim accurately. The claim may not produce a
recovery. In order to survive in the market, the attorney has to ensure
that he has more winning claims, or more valuable winning claims, than
he does losing claims. The fact that part of his income arises from
winning claims and that he does not get paid for losing claims cannot be
reasonably construed to mean that the winning claims pay for the losing
claims. Rather, the losing claims and the winning claims are a function
of the market.
IV. PROPOSALS
Because the lodestar no longer accurately gauges the types of fee
structures that the market has produced, it is no longer able to accurately
award attorney's fees. The lodestar never could answer the question it
was supposed to answer: "What is a reasonable attorney's fee?" As a
result, courts were sent groping for answers, looking for some set of
principles to guide them in ascertaining and awarding a reasonable fee.
The courts searched in vain for an objective standard for awarding
attorney's fees and valuing attorney work product. The Supreme Court
adopted a time/rate calculation and a discretionary adjustment based on
the factors articulated in the Model Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
Although this provided the courts with a start, the lodestar procedure
itself was cumbersome, and scholars did not hesitate to note the burden
it placed on the courts. The by-product of the use of the Disciplinary
Rules was the incorporation of ethical standards into what was supposed
to be an evaluative undertaking.
The most significant problem with the lodestar, however, was that it
could no longer accurately gauge the types of fee structures that the
market was producing, and, as a result it was no longer able to
accurately award attorney's fees. "Reasonable" attorney's fees are
those that an attorney can recover on the market for such fees, and the
market for fees was changing significantly. As the legal market has
changed over the past two decades, attorneys, firms and their clients
have made dramatic innovations in the way they contract for fees. In
addition to hourly fees, attorneys and clients contract to handle cases
based on set fees for a certain volume of cases, mixed contingent and
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hourly fees, and simple contingency fee agreements.' 5 9 Today lawyers
and their clients contract for fees in many innovative and creative ways,
and these innovations serve not only to provide needed flexibility to the
contracting parties, they provide an economic benefit and improve the
services clients can request and receive from the legal profession.
The lodestar's focus solely on hourly rates is not only limited, it is
outdated and inaccurate. In City of Burlington v. Dague, the lower
courts sought to address the changing market and the prevalence of
contingent claims by introducing an "enhancement," but the Supreme
Court imprudently dismissed the addition. The justification for refusing
contingency enhancements was not economic, but vaguely based on
attorneys' ethics. Now, in addition to the perennial criticisms heaped on
the lodestar-it is burdening the courts with unnecessary procedures
and considerations-the lodestar fails in its most important and vital
function: the valuation of attorney work product.
It is time for the lodestar to recognize and consider the contingent fee
arrangement at last. In this way, the court may take into consideration
not only the theoretical "reasonableness" of attorney's fees, the court
may view and consider the fee arrangement in effect in the very case
before it. The court may at last utilize the product of the market for
claims that, in the end, provides an objective valuation of the attorney's
work product based on the merits of the client's underlying claim.
Finally, where courts already engage in a de facto contingent fee
analysis, the use of the contingent fee can become honest and open,
where ethical concerns can be addressed as real ethical concerns, not
attorneys shame in awarding themselves fees.
A. Consider Both Hourly and Contingency Fees for Attorneys
Under this proposal, a court would examine attorney's fees according
to their value on the market, and would consider both contingent fee
markets and hourly fee markets. The court would not be limited in its
159. As one commentator cautioned:
However, the time/rate computation element must be put into perspective. It is de-
signed only as a starting point. There are several uncertainties and ambiguities inher-
ent in the time/rate formula, making neither a stable measure nor an easily applied one.
In the first place, the notion that there are fixed hourly rates that can be attributed to all
lawyers and used as objective markers of the worth of their services is somewhat of an
illusion. These rates have never existed for contingent fee lawyers, since time and
hourly rates are irrelevant for their type of practice. And the rates that supposedly exist
in corporate practice are not fixed but frequently change in response to various consid-
erations.
7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 114, § 1803.
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lodestar analysis to the hourly market for attorney's fees. The court
considers not only the hourly rate for attorneys, but the value of the
claim as a property claim bearing a contingency fee. Many federal
district courts already consider what the contingent fee award would be
as a matter of practice. 16° The court determines which claims were
successful on the basis of which claims were awarded a recovery.
There are some benefits to considering both the contingent fee
arrangement with an hourly fee arrangement. Consideration of a
reasonable contingent fee arrangement may provide the court with a
more representative view of the market for claims. In turn, the court
may be more able to accurately value the attorney's work product on the
case because the court would in effect have two separate indications of
value. Therefore, regardless of whether the attorney takes the case on a
contingent or an hourly fee or some combination, in a legal environment
where various arrangements are available to clients, they may be made
available for consideration by the trial court.
In essence, however, the additional consideration of the contingent
fee does little to ease the lodestar burden currently weighing on the
courts. In addition to the time/rate calculation, the court must proceed
to consider what would be a reasonable contingency. In cases where the
client entered into an hourly fee with the attorney for the prosecution of
the suit, consideration of a comparable contingent fee may have little
relevance. More important, it replicates many of the lodestar's
evaluative problems because the court has to formulate a market for the
case as a contingency fee case when it was prosecuted as an hourly fee
case. Instead of consulting the real market that produced the fee
arrangement between client and counsel, the court has to provide one
itself.
B. Consider Either Hourly or Contingency Fees for Attorneys
The court examines attorney's fees according to their value on the
market. If the claim before the court was prosecuted on an hourly fee,
the court examines the market for hourly fees. If the claim before the
court was prosecuted on a contingent fee, the court considers the market
for contingent fees. The free market of claims and negotiated fees will
provide the proper standard.
The value in considering the actual fee arrangement entered in
determining reasonable attorney's fees in a case may seem self-evident.
160. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the lodestar
method, especially in its application during litigation over attorney's fees).
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But this does not seem to be self-evident to the courts. By considering a
contingent fee arrangement in a contingency case and an hourly fee in
an hourly fee case, the court can dispense with time wasted proceeding
with theoretical fee arrangements that were not utilized and never
existed in the pending case. The court no longer has to construct
theoretical markets for "reasonable" fees because the market for claims
has produced what is presumed to be a reasonable fee already. In
addition, by considering the contingent or the hourly fee arrangement,
the court may more properly represent the market for attorney work
product, claims and attorney's fees in today's legal profession. The
courts should encourage and assist attorneys addressing the needs of
their clients with flexible arrangements that do not fit the typical hourly
fee arrangement model.
A critique of the use of the actual fee arrangement would likely be
based on ethical issues, not economics. In fact, it may be asserted that
the fee arrangement before the court was not reasonable, or
circumstances may justify a court's disregarding a fee arrangement.
Such ethical concerns, however, are not particular to contingent fee
arrangements, and the ethical duties of attorneys are the same under
either fee arrangement. As the case with hourly fee arrangements,
ethical concerns under a contingent fee arrangement should be
addressed under applicable ethical principles and law. Further, if the
court determines that the fee arrangement involved the attorney's taking
advantage of a client, then recourse can be had not only through ethics
procedures, but also under substantive contracts law. The fee
arrangement between the attorney and the client is, in the end, a
contract, and recourse should be had under the law of contracts. The
law of contracts provides both settled and tested defenses, remedies and
procedures that govern contracts like that between the attorney and
client.
C. The Reasonableness Standard
The "reasonableness" standard should only be resorted to in cases of
unconscionability, duress or similar extraordinary circumstances. It
should not be used as a "gatekeeper" governing standard. The free
market of claims and negotiated fees will provide the proper standard.
As in all other claims, the court should interfere only if the claim is
clearly unconscionable or requires otherwise extraordinary action.
contracts law allows this in situations of fraud, duress and acts of God.
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V. CONCLUSION
In determining reasonable attorney's fees, the courts should do what
is most economically reasonable, and allocate attorney's fees after
considering the fee arrangement in effect between the attorney and
client before the court. 161 For too long courts have either clung to
pseudo-ethical limitations on attorney's fees (when the question is not
one of ethics) or have repeatedly relied on the lodestar method's ability
to determine a reasonable fee. In City of Burlington v. Dague, Justice
Scalia clings to the lodestar and the strong presumption that it
determines reasonable fees. Such a presumption, however, only re-asks
the question, "what is a reasonable fee?" It is time for a change, a
simple reformulation of the lodestar. As courts clamor for an objective
standard in valuing attorney work product and attorney's fee claims, the
response should come from an economics analysis. A reasonable fee
should be the attorney's fee that is recoverable on the market for legal
claims. The market for claims seeks to ensure the most efficient
allocation of judicial resources to the client at the lowest price. The
market for claims provides an actual and objective standard by which
the court can ascertain the value of the attorney's work product, and
apportion an appropriate fee accordingly.
161. It should be noted, however, that either of the above proposals better addresses the
question facing courts than does the present lodestar formulation.
